# Living in the event of technology

Wolfgang Schirmacher[1]

## Inscriptions

## Abstract

In this essay Wolfgang Schirmacher argues for an approach that perceives technology as an *event,* as a happening that is concealed and yet obvious. His position can be distinguished in two ways. To Schirmacher our present understanding is governed by the bias that technology is a means to an end, what Martin Heidegger referred to as *Gestell,* or (technological) enframing. In Schirmacher's view such a craft or tool-oriented approach is upheld by a technological-scientific world-view that is characterised by its "mad attempt to deny the world in which we live." On the other hand Schirmacher goes beyond Heidegger's view by claiming that technology should be perceived as an *event* rather than as simply a frame. In this manner we are enabled to grasp the technological phenomenon as a cosmic relation manifest in our lived experience.

Keywords: phenomenology; philosophy of technology; event; Heidegger; instrumentalism

## Survival technology

All around us, in plain view, technology happens, and so remains all the more concealed. In the same way an inherently productive nature is simply used by us, unthinkingly, so too unfolds, without our understanding, the event of technology, a natural process, human as no other. For over a hundred years modern philosophy of technology has sought and failed to reveal the identity of technology. Instead it has all too often exhausted itself in debates about civilization or in the accumulation of pseudo-knowledge resultant from micro-analyses. Provoked by the bias that technology is a means to an end, formed through time by our exploitation of (and emphasis on) its instrumentality, the destruction of the world by modern technology is still being misunderstood as the wrong implementation of tools or the insufficient determination of purpose. When attempts to avoid the misapplication of technology inexplicably fail, they are blamed on the inadequacy of human nature which, depending on the viewpoint, is either accepted as the nature of things or considered to be capable of improvement in the long term. Yet, this seemingly insightful self-criticism immunizes against the necessary assumption that such perspectives on technology dangerously obscure the phenomenon precisely by providing a plausible explanation. We can usually penetrate such obscurity through a more exact disclosure of circumstances, but this approach to the phenomenon of technology comes up against unimagined

---

difficulties. For technology's well-founded scientific-systematic definition as *applied natural sciences*, as well as its unproblematic day-to-day use as a tool, cannot be improved. As useful as they have been to date, these constructs fail to recognize what is becoming ever more apparent: our technological successes are killing us. The solution embraced by many a theorist of technology, to present past successes in hindsight as avoidable mistakes, all the while continuing to hail momentary success, as long as humanly possible, as the right path, follows the logic of lemmings. What is more, even a lifeworld reasoning which in many and varied ways advocates for the limited use of technology as tool, for zero growth and for return to the trades, must appear as nothing but a mad attempt to deny the world in which we live.

Abandoned in this way by prevailing interpretations of technology, the philosophical understanding of technology faces a phenomenon which is likely to decide the survival of the human species and which eludes us precisely because it also prominently bears the likeness of our earth. Yet if the concealment of technology is clearly not revealed by knowledge, but paradoxically rather strengthened, only ignorance can help. It is merely in terms of knowledge that ignorance is nothing. In the Socratic admission of not knowing, a deprivation of the self-evident right of knowledge can on the contrary be effected by a kind of knowledge itself. What we know thus far is obviously not worth much. Metaphysics which we have wrongly declared to be the paradigm of thinking, is nothing but an ingenious expression of a survival technique under conditions of an ignorance perceived as threatening. This behavioral technique, once sustained by a justified fear of the extinction of humankind, characteristically classifies as potentially hostile everything encountered and needs must be brought under control by any and all means. Experience shows this kind of emergency stopgap, a technology necessarily violent, ill-suited, and hidebound, though quite successful in the short term, is nevertheless of little use. In the long run it is even unsustainable and, as we observe in the case of metaphysics today, it is ultimately turning aggressively against those who use it.

If we seek to properly understand the phenomenon of technology, we must not surrender to a technology whose consciousness, distorted by fear, is fixated on its own survival and its waste product, knowledge. Instead, we have to practice the technology of truth, in which the phenomena show themselves as they are, as they are perceived by us. Certainly, the technology of truth – in the same way as machine technology, language technology, and all other technologies – has been weaponized in service to the survival technology of metaphysics, and has been disfigured to the point of becoming its own untruth in constructions such as "absolute truth" or "truth pluralism." To be sure, abuse is an inevitable possibility of everything, and itself a technology we call war. But the war between humans and nature, which gave rise to metaphysics, has in the main long since ended. We are no longer destroying a nature barely extant on this planet of ours; we have turned our destructive force against the very civilisation we have had a hand in creating, particularly its ecological elements.

Only when we have weaned ourselves from the prevailing technology as a general survival technique can we, through the technology of truth, comprehend the phenomenon of technology itself. Philosophers have laid the groundwork in preparation. For all their differences, the great thinkers of the Western tradition of philosophy are distinguished by the fact that they refrained from exploiting metaphysics as a technology of war, but saw it rather as an unavoidable provisional solution, which, on the course to true knowledge, must be traversed and overcome, thus rendering it superfluous. Spinoza, Hegel and Heidegger dare such overstepping of boundaries which does not merely appear to abandon metaphysics. Transgressions of this kind will be necessary exercises for us in a technology of truth we have yet to learn. For all that, we are already capable of the process, which the technology of truth conceptually grasps, as a matter of course, though without our being aware of it. So good are we at truth that even the metaphysics that has prevailed for more than two thousand years could not prevent us from breathing, moving, feeling. But it now becomes evident in language what technology, in its concepts, means, and this through renunciation of our accustomed technology cast from metaphysics, and remaining untroubled by its servile consciousness. For the familiar consciousness is incapable of really comprehending, to do so it would have to venture out into the world. It consists instead of self-assuring incantations; is the armored hedgehog position, ready to fire behind its viewing slit. Above all, consciousness is self-aware, and can thus be deceived since such a self-referential structure is nothing but a blind mirror onto which graffiti can be perfectly painted. In keeping with a technology determined by metaphysics, consciousness, in truth, is a life reduced to its killing instinct.

The technology of truth is no more a theory or praxis than is instrumental technology, but like every technology a production process which neither precedes theory and praxis in the customary sense, nor proceeds from them. It is a process of ushering forth, whose movement coincides with its products. Whereas instrumental technology, whose violence has today turned from the destruction of others for one's own protection to self-destruction, shows through its intrinsic structure it is designed for production of materials exclusively for purposes of war, down to the Trojan horse 'critique of metaphysics', the technology of truth generates all manner of events, undamaged in their play of revealing and concealing.

A phenomenon that is interpreted metaphysically will be mutilated, masterly deformed into a weapon; yet simply allowing it its truth grants the phenomenon its fullness. Technology consciously creates and works under conditions of deficience - it cannot do otherwise - deliberately defeats the phenomenon in order to inventively reconstruct it. It is a technology generative of artifacts with a high degree of emptiness, a void artfully crammed with abstract language replete with proofs and justifications. It is quite different with the technology of truth. It allows the entire phenomenon, in its appeal, to be perceived at once, suddenly and at any time. This appears extraordinary only to our ubiquitous technology 'artificial intelligence' for which every situation, to even begin to be comprehensible, must first be assembled from a vast number of individual bits of information. However, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, perception as a most ordinary human life technique immediately understands the entirety of the situation and can then go on to focus on details at will. For the phenomenon shows itself, effortlessly answers for itself if we do not deny it its language, as occurs through metaphysical-hostile appropriation. But if the phenomenon is allowed to appear in language through the technology of truth, however raw and unpracticed it may at first come about, nothing can save the metaphysical lie, covered with elaborate methodologies, no matter how strong the existential interest vested in it may be. For its emptiness calls our notice to the real fullness, and its distorted features await redress.

Reconciliation however exists solely in the lived insight into the conditions of the cosmos, for the phenomenon of technology corresponds only to these. Most difficult for us is the insight into the condition we call 'being human' and through which we claim to be ourselves. For the human process of truth to unfold, immunity to illusion is indispensible. It has long been the concern of human individuals to be deprived of one's identity, thus being enslaved – alive, yet being nothing. Against this basic anxiety, against this trauma of losing self, we conceive humanity and impose sanctions on all who would deny us our metaphysical role as an image of God, as the only consciousness, as ruler over nature, as the subject of all actions. From these entitlements have humans derived their claim to special treatment, chartered in human rights, as well as to our self-understanding according to which the rest of nature exists to serve us alone and all activities stand in relation to us. The Copernican Revolution has not shaken the self-confidence of even the least of all humans in being the center of the earth.

## Spinoza's departure from humanism

When Spinoza abandoned the failed ideal of humanity, it was drastic and complete, and with the necessarily inhuman perspective called divine: Substantia sive Deus sive Natura. He did this guardedly and hidden behind traditional terminology, but we should today repeat Spinoza's move regardless. From him we learn the first and most bitter renunciation of beliefs: there is no image of God; we are not the center. Once we have abandoned the human – this is how radical the break is – all the ghosts of metaphysics vanish. Suddenly their stage has withered, their independence was all an act, they were never anything more than the functional elements of the failed myth of the human. What is the point of a God when there are no humans? What does nature mean if there is no intellect resisting it? What is the good of scientific categorization of the world when no one wants to rule? Who needs purpose that is of no use? Why speculate when there is nothing to gain from speculation? As phenomenon, the human being is nothing more than the expression of development, of an openness into thought, which can be defined as the characteristics of unified experience recognizable by us. Limited in the extreme by two sensoria, only through our body and mind do we know of cosmos. In the presence of all that remains closed to us, yet still exists through time and happens all around us, we are humbled, a phenomenon among phenomena. The otherness in cosmic unity does not justify inferiority, nor any right to dominance presumed therefrom. We are obliged to act in a way that we do not destroy ourselves, thereby contributing to preservation and fulfillment in our small way, which nevertheless is not to be underestimated.

With this insight from Spinoza, we evade the metaphysical necessity; we experience what is true, without consciously needing to know, and live freely. The phenomenon of technology, to which we have first given contour with the severing of our anthropocentric bonds, is not threatened in its manifestation by our demands. The vastness of the cosmic perspective has not distanced us from ourselves, but rather brought us nearer. For in the attempt to control things and to assimilate the other, we were often not ourselves. We were beside ourselves, furious and violent. We sent home reports of victory, but house and home fell to ruin. Now the world is without a master. Our metaphysical reflex, however, urges us to introduce new masters such as constraints, structures and other objectivisms. But the conditions that hold together what belongs together have endured masters, not needed them. Freed from parasites, things carry on in their own way. There is an unimaginable diversity in unity, an ever streaming change in complex harmony. Reason reduced to causality cannot satisfy the senses; it joins the game of the world as one recuperating from a serious illness. Its rules seem simple and strict: every player strives as far as it matters to stay in the game.

The human condition to which we always belong adapts to the situation such that the game continues.

Refusal to participate, inventing a different game, or fraudulent gaming, all lead to exclusion, as we today are suffering across the planet. This is the destruction for which we are to blame, the untimely death, and the end of the game, forced by its own compulsion. There is no superiority, because we are inevitably in the game. It cannot be stopped, nor can it be abstracted. We must make our bets – as all things do – without delay. World comportment performs what is appropriate, is the breath in contrast to which intention and result – deficient forms of bets – are void. Neither the act, which in a flight from early death makes itself creator, nor the receptivity which reinterprets impotence as irresponsibility, measure up to the world game.

Participating in the world game allows us a receptivness to the nature to which we belong; to our salvation it is to a large extent without our knowing. The other nature, like the street tree of a big city, gives itself with its own ways and their effects fully to the game. The street tree's collaboration is productive, shows itself as the work of generating oxygen, and to the day it withers and dies from the overpowering toxins produced by street traffic, acts in keeping with the situation. This situation is not something accepted by the tree, but has rather become what it is through the years of neglect, our ignoring the damage, and through our ignorance, so it is treated in accordance with its devolution. True completion is not a goal, it is the self-fulfilled situation itself. It is achieved in an ecological habitat when the human and non-human phenomena found in the environment participate in equal measure. Our senses will pick up on the conditions around us which decide when this is the case. The life living its worth, the healthy, thriving tree, the fortuitous thought speak for themselves. Birth and death, eating and being eaten, adaptation and development, pain and joy, rise and fall, and similar integral processes are characteristic of the ordinary remarkable situation. These processes constitute its activities. Only degenerative destruction as well as self-destruction signal the balance is threatened – and in so doing fulfill their function. Destruction, too, is accorded its role in the universal continuity; even suicide validates completion. In the fully realized work process, which remains ever attentive so that no phenomenon takes revenge through destruction, in its way cosmos happens, we human beings live as befits our nature and within a heartbeat to ourselves.

In this nearness we freely encounter the phenomenon of technology. It shows itself as the natural way to accord with the self-fulfilling of the cosmos. We recognize our life processes, our connections with other phenomena, are of a technical nature. Technology is the way we acculturate to the universal process development. It begins with our technique of breathing [Atem], which has evolved from the efforts of our first cry to imperceptibility and thus to perfection, ending perhaps at present in nuclear [Atom] technology. We call breathing natural, but nuclear technology is also simply a development of our nature. It happens in accordance with the cosmos in depending upon the possibilities the non-human nature offers us. The distinction between a technology which humans used before, or which are not species-specific, and one created and practiced only by us, is a stylizing of the distinction between new and established phenomena. Every technology has had an initial appearance. The overvaluation of the new is characteristic of metaphysical man, who over time created his own eternity and now fervently longs for the new, since what he hopes for is the revocation of his death.

As Spinoza discerned before us, in our active looking away from the metaphysical human, the phenomenon of technology presents itself as a communication system eager to learn, one that sustains natural behavior.

Not only is it able to modify and vary processes — a capability which has been misunderstood as an imitation of nature — but it is also attentive to other phenomena, and in response enters as work process into its exchange, into the world game. It is *this* that makes technology our only useful contribution, substantial and accessible at the same time. Not a technology of truth, theory disrupts, as does anthropocentric, thus violent practice, free interplay; it is of no use. The work process of technology changes the world; this allows for concord with and not separation from movement of change, the basic dynamics of the world that is prior to all interpretation. Technology happens with no intention and no boundaries. This key aspect of it is obscured in the metaphysical conception of technology. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of technology proves to be tautological: its concern is its functioning. This functioning, its work process, is technology.

So far we have sought to understand functioning only as the fulfillment of the task we have assigned to technology. It is therefore not surprising that no technology works without operational malfunction. Only rarely, and against our will, have objective and functioning been in agreement. For technological functioning is all-encompassing. Its success does not observe human standards, but rather takes part in the sweep of lived experience with infinite consideration. Otherwise, its functioning would be threatened by circumstances not having been taken into account, rendering technology itself inadequate. Peace is the logic of technology. For this reason, metaphysical war technologies, which imposed on technology their intentions, i.e. hostile goals, could only achieve disruption. Today, this disorder has within its reach the destruction of the world. Should we replace the wrong application of technology with a proper one? Even then, technology would still be assaulted and prevented from being itself. Any attempt to eliminate dysfunctions by improving scientific and technological mastery can only produce an even more complex and thus more uncontrollable technology. This dreaded, unleashed technology would no longer let itself be bound to a model corresponding to human

measure. Instead of serving as a technology reduced to a model of reality, it would appear in its nature as a mode of reality. We could understand it as our appreciation and safeguard of the diversity of the world. Will the technology of metaphysics come to full fruition and be unleashed into a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions before we technicians realize our part? We are the ones who are saved by a technology as life form, still in its infancy. Freed from anthropocentric measures, not controlled and thus inhibited, but freely accomplished, our technology happens as self-fulfilling process, alert for avoidable failures, and with renewed consideration for the right of individual being. Technology reveals itself as a comprehensible human contribution to the incomprehensible harmony of the cosmos.

## Hegel's salvation of ambiguity

Technology demands our entire being, but metaphysical disintegration of the world makes our behavior in the phenomenon of technology uncertain. We experience technology as something external to us, and have not yet acknowledged its diverse unity which is our life. The departure from anthropocentrism which left its mark on human existence, is considered a Spinozistic postulate, not a description of our situation. But we must give up these definitions, these handy, unambiguously labelled weapons, as well as the corresponding presumptuous view that logic is exempted from speaking about reality. Tyranny over language dissipates in the ambiguity of the technology of truth. In contrast to dogmatization, the method of equivocation can bring together again that which in relation belongs together. It does not need to serve the concealment in language, as during the reign of metaphysics, but makes possible a disclosing, which constitutes Hegel's dialectic. Identity, which had seemed reassured and certain, must once again pass through difference, diversity and opposition, and then grasps its active truth only in contradiction.

Ambiguity, robbing us of the phenomenal innocence to see a thing in one way and not another, does not hide by its nature. Its meanings are not the same. Rather, ambiguity is openness to cosmic movement, and without it we would not exist. Certain meanings may correspond best to the movement, are true, fulfill themselves, are strong, impose themselves, and with the same opening of language set to work more easily. Ambiguous language is also attuned to possibilities – whence it came, how it speaks, what it can become. Singleness of meaning is the violent suppression of the whisper, the unexpressed, the wordless. It matters however not only to admire the diversity, but to understand it as sensible. The work of dissolution carried out by equivocation is not arbitrary. Hegel's creative, absolute negativity does not remove the strongholds in order to negatively establish them. By circumventing metaphysical rules of thinking we are able to generalize concrete concepts. So a net is woven, a texture of interlacing ties, painful to sensory certainty, for it is not completed by us, it is simply the visible aspect through which the human spirit fully realizes itself as technology of truth. This is a work of conceptual dialectics that can bring tradition's contradictory technical expertise and the technical knowledge concealed therein into procedural factual unity. Hegel's cosmic insight, which pierces the finite through toward the infinite, is in no way inferior to Spinoza's view. Hegel's dialectic does not provide prognoses, but illuminates and makes transparent the phenomenon of technology. That is unwonted labor. We may know a great deal, but question too little and barely understand. Our time is characterized by the most diverse of views; we have the concept of a pluralistic society. Everyone is right, the conservatives as well as the revolutionaries, *Critical Theory* as much as *Critical Rationalism*. But this entitlement, this breach of the ever real in reasonable opinion deprives us of reality, destroys our lives. In the competition of an unappeased world, compelled by the time given, which always seemed to be too limited for survival, we decide in favor of the fleeting ray of light of truth and take it for - *pars pro toto* - the whole.

Conceptual dialectics, however, preserves the connections of the free phenomenon of technology. In it we find both the first steps toward modern technology as well as the aftermath of historical epochs of thought. World phenomena which prove to be related, are disparate among themselves in the understanding of the technology of metaphyics. Some names indicate a common origin. Method of thought, large-scale technology, craft, or machine cannot be that far apart. Yet other phenomena have their historical geneses in a countermove to technology, have excluded themselves from it, and yet retain a connection to technology by figuring as its antithesis, such as politics, morality, art, but also truth, theory and even metaphysics. Most phenomena, however, will recognize technology only as a sub-discipline which as such is unable to affect its definition. This is the case with business, science, society, practice, and not least in our conception of language. In this way they hide their technical nature. They comply only with a distorted aspect of the phenomenon of technology. For what technology means is taught rather by love than mind. Its realization, which includes the pain of its failures, happens as technology.

In contrast, the metaphysical technology of war will bequeath us as scientific-technological advancement a ruined environment, a shattered common, and a destroyed inner world. In the same way metaphysics remains for its failure interdependent upon the cosmos, so too is there a limit to which the phenomenon of

technology can be damaged. The phenomenon has developed undeterred by concealment. Even destruction is a triumph of technology. It happens through technologies and suggests how technology is misused and hindered. Every elimination of error from the technology itself requires improved technology. But such improvement, shaped by metaphysical incomprehension, soon turns out to be a new malfunction. Cured in turn by the unadvised remedy of a better technology, this leads to an unforeseen dynamic in technological development. As a consequence, all areas of life are technicized, and complex large-scale technologies are embedded in production and society in ways that no one had wanted. Those responsible for only their partial technology still believe they can be mastered, albeit with more and more difficulty. But no one is able to have a full view of the unintended, and even unthinkable, interrelations and repercussions that arise in their consortium. Even though technology is only at the beginning of its development, it withdraws ever more clearly from the human dimension. What we call secondary consequences of technology overshadow the intended and planned primary results.

The frenzy of technology begins with an explosion of anthropocentric time. With intent we improve the technology of metaphysics, but unintentionally, because we cannot control it, we help the event of technology achieve its breakthrough. This unintentional acting below the surface of plans and designs, that we live today, is our technology. But as long as it remains beyond our comprehension, necessarily misunderstanding itself as metaphysical consciousness, it remains the weapon system and will destroy the human species in its conquest of nature. In conceptual dialectics a weave can emerge which is capable of binding even the technology of metaphysics to its absolute concept.

## Heidegger's opening of the familiar

Turning away from the humanist and the technology of truth in the dialectic text does not guarantee the strikingly new. Such an expectation is a stratagem of metaphysics, which, while proclaiming something new, knows full well that this future is merely its own novelty. In exchange for its abdication, metaphysics demands the impossible. A compliant revolution nevertheless remains metaphysical, even against its will, since only new labels will be made available. Metaphysics fears a mind that finds out how this technology of survival is sustained. This sounds like a secret. But secrets are rewards of war technology, and being allowed to search for them is considered an honor. Thinking is held in suspense by secrets and thus lured away from the essential question. But there is another move that shields the technology of metaphysics from insight even better: concealment through triviality. If it persists, no cosmic behavior, no conceptual dialectics, will abandon metaphysics. Instead they become idioms for an inner personal exoneration. Cosmic pseudo-expanse and dialectical artistry at least enabled a glass bead game, moved by notions of shattered harmony and withheld diversity.

But the technology of metaphysics has made invisible what has to be grasped. The finding of it, where it is to be sought, will be contested, that whoever discovered it, has nothing to show. This most dangerous phenomenon to metaphysics is also the most obvious. Nothing less is worth talking about; it appears meaningless because it is too self-evident. Any occupation with it isolates. In the canon of rational speech, discussions about the number of angels on the head of a pin have their place. But anyone who elevates trivial matters is branded unscientific. The greatest taboo in metaphysics is effective because it is indiscernible as a taboo. Nothing of the stated phenomenon is disputed, since it is defined by the fact that it is outside reasonable dispute. It is the way it is, there is no need to talk about it, it is said. Problems needing to be solved, occur only where something is questionable. Trivial sentences, because there is no knowledge gained, are empty.

It can now be understood how strong the influence of metaphysics is. For more than two thousand years our thinking has been delimited by a world view that would collapse in the face of questions posed by fools and children. For how could it be that the greatest fulfillment, given voice in language, turns out to be empty? What nonsense is it to ignore how life is lived and instead chase the appearance of problems? How can that which says everything be meaningless? Is it not misleading to try to capture with science and to imitate through reflection what we have always known? Why do we insist on learning from mistakes when it is success that is our teacher? Why are we always looking for complications, when nothing is closer to us than effortlessness? Is it not suicide to disregard the familiar, but to revere an intricate complexity by which we cannot live, as the highest expression of our species? Can that be questioned which unquestionably also affords this questioning ability? What is the point of disgruntled questions when we exist only as courageous answers? Does not the right questioning merely end confusion?

Such philosophical questions are met with strong resistance. Heidegger, who was the last to bring them up, believed himself protected by esotericism. After his Nazi period, which proved his incapacity for political judgment, he fled to the poets. But what *thinking* meant to Heidegger, happens every day. His groundwork is marked by the resistance of metaphysics and therefore fails to recognize its own meaning, but it is sufficient

for us to go further. Heidegger's guiding question about *the meaning of Being* attempts to regain that liveliness of cosmic movement for human self-interpretation, of which metaphysics is a symbiotic parasite, but which it nevertheless withholds from us. Heidegger cautiously brings to light the inconspicuous familiar in which cosmos happens. For the metaphysical defense strategy is not exhausted in the scientific uselessness of the trivial. To escape the philosophical astonishment that has been ignited again and again by what was previously taken for granted, concealment within the trivial takes on an active meaning. Recalling that which is familiar may be recognized as a reasonable pursuit. Metaphysics reserves the right to define the object of investigation. In this it is not dogmatic, but allows problems to be negotiated under titles such as everyday life, lifeworld, the ontic, beings, common sense, natural attitude or sensory certainty. Prepared in this manner, the inconspicuous familiar becomes neutralized and usable; the law of metaphysics shines in its refutation of the naive claim of such interpretations of the world. However, with each triumph of reason, which serves to allay our doubts about metaphysics, we become even more unfamiliar to ourselves. Having become an object, the technology of metaphysics can count us as inventory. We are technologically standardized, scientifically valid prognoses can be made. Our nature endures, because the uncanny as well as the familiar is defined by their range. Rules, not ideas, determine this life.

While the abundance of the familiar is plundered by metaphysics, it remains the material with which it brings about oblivion. The mundane as well as lifeworld, the ontic as well as beings, common sense, natural attitudes, or sensory certainties, each seeks to express an experience of the familiar. One cannot infer from its manner of speaking that it has been chosen by war technology. Apparently each expression strives in its rendition to come as close as possible to the disposition of the assigned role. What we discover, the non-trivial result of our investigation into the trivial, is that these interpretations cannot, in the end, hold their own against philosophical reason, and that each emerges against sensory appearance. The technology of metaphysics remains the model for all illusionists. It finds out what it has put in and whoever suffers damage gets to pay. The condemnation of triviality is brought about by itself. But reason, so deceived, suspects that these surrogates only serve to denounce what is inconspicuously familiar. Phenomenally, the everyday lifeworld is a combination of violence of the customary, denial of self and fooling all encountered. In fear and training, compromise and remorse, we grow senile as we approach our repressed death. The world, dismembered into beings, is being used up in unaccustomed and malicious ways. We use a divine being, in relation to us, strong in words and weak in action, to legitimize our dictatorship over things and people. The common sense ethics follows its short-sighted advantage, our daily increasingly poisoned bread, does not inhabit the earth, but despoils it. A hypocritical appeal to the self-evident covers over that which does not go without saying. The self-evident is understandable only to our self-interest. As Hegel showed in the most drastic of terms, a sensory certainty of natural approach does not open up to a rich, developing world. Instead, it demands for partial knowledge exclusive ownership, and claims for it universality. The natural attitude wants to own it as property; to utilize it and yet to keep it. Impermanence, the freedom of becoming, is a state that has to be eliminated as my view point. That is the promise of the technology of metaphysics; a promise it cannot keep even after paving over the world with concrete.

What appears familiar, self-evident, ordinary, everyday, natural, certain, and suggested is also the most uncanny: the murderous grimace in the mirror of our acts. Humanity has been misappropriated, repurposed as fighting machine. The human-all-too-human deserves trust neither from us nor from things. Its father is war, its manner devastation, its principle hatred, its result untimely death. Just as everything can become destructive, and every truth can be reinterpreted metaphysically, so has the familiar become incomprehensible when it no longer appears to us as existent. Nevertheless, the work of the familiar, although inconspicuous, is in negation close to thinking. Whether in dialectical contradiction or in nihilistic revaluation, what is given, every day, and the natural, so customary, is not recognized as familiar. But even this does not break open the concealment of the technology of metaphysics. For with the unmasking of the ordinary as nothingness, its completely other, the inclusive, the whole is sought a long way off. The result is an abstract system that considers itself to be true wholeness simply because it escaped the ordinary. World spirit, historical law, people, society and similar prime forces meet the requirements of the technology of metaphysics, allowing it to continue to dominate and to fight. Anyone who has seen through this escape mechanism which accommodates metaphysics rejected it, as did Adorno, but left open how the familiar could be. Create no image, that seemed important. But this attitude is only preparatory; if it becomes an end in itself, it becomes untrue. The liberation of the true from metaphysics, however, the release of the inconspicuous familiar from its use in the daily struggle for life, happens where trust has been deceived. This is the last, the best move of the metaphysical defense. Truth and lies become indistinguishable. Exposing the lie, performed as a critical play with a changing cast, prevents discovery of the evident truth, the truth that topples the metaphysical world.

Not until Heidegger, though he too shied away from the consequences, does critique, in performance, turn into its opposite. It brings about unity instead of exploiting divisions. Heidegger does not join in the efforts

against metaphysics to appeal directly to physics, nature, and sensuousness, for these are easily overcome with the help of mediation. Even the irrefutable testimony of personal experience is ineffective as basis for everyday certainty. A metaphysics surpassed through a transcending power, be it God or the absolute, nothingness or Being, is only an apparent eclipse, and instead serves as its duplication. The greatest blunder, however, is provoked by the light of reason. Without being asked, we illuminate phenomena, illuminate them down into to the last corner and leave them open at all times in bright, artificial light. The situation of such phenomena caught in the light of reason is like that of people in a totalitarian state: measured, divided, observed. Dragged off to a cell that is lit day and night, they cannot expect justice. Under constant questioning, they are tortured by their tormentors when their answers are deemed unsatisfactory. But it is no more possible to infer anything about the nature of a human being, so broken in short time, than it is to make conclusions about phenomena, those enlightened by reason and examined by science. Merely the torturers are confirmed in their opinion of the nature of people and things.

The phenomenon of the familiar, manifest in ordinariness and other miseries, must first of all be respected in its inconspicuousness. To force it into the light, hand it over to knowledge, puts the familiar at the mercy of metaphysics, it becomes unfamiliar. The transparent and identified phenomenon is perfect only to metaphysics, with respect to itself it is robbed of its vitality, reduced to a weapon, and made useful in the war between human beings and nature. In Heidegger's clearing, however, achieved through language as a technology of truth, we encounter the phenomena in the open, though rarely in broad daylight. They are not chased along as if driven, but step out into the open of their own accord, like deer to graze. It is for us to find the clearing, wait quietly, and remain open. Whether at dawn, at noon or, most commonly, at dusk, we grasp this event as it appears to us in itself, in a way that is appropriate to it and to us. We do not lie in wait, we make no demands and we are not dissatisfied. We do not misjudge, but in the changing light we understand what becomes evident, emerges from the darkness of its life and into the clearing that is our life. With the technology of truth, we do not arrive at a sacred grove where truth resides on feast days. This myth is as alienating as the conception of science that furthers it, the view that we can capture the place and time of truth in a prototype, and thereby force it to appear, hold on to it and reproduce it. The clearing of truth as an event has already been forgotten in myth, and science can never catch up with it. Truth cannot run away; nor can it be sought out, because with life we have found our truth. The technology of truth is in truth our own technology. We exist as openness, an openness assured all the more by this technology the more fully actualized it becomes. No one can claim that we have command of our existence. The clearing is no more our work than is the light of reason; we are its work.

In the clearing we understand our nature and therefore our limits. We are the limited clearing of an incomprehensible, silent life force of unlimited diversity, as we surmise from the phenomena of the clearing. But while we are able to comprehend these particular, revealed phenomena, their full reality cannot be experienced. There is a beyond that never enters the clearing and yet can be decisive for the life of the whole. But that does not matter. The cosmos can take care of itself, we do not have to pose as its guardian. Our only assignment is the fulfillment of our human nature as openness. The state of the human world after unabated clearing, teaches us how difficult this will be, how attuned, almost sentient, but at the very least, how life-sustaining the technology for this will have to be. We have wasted centuries robbing others, soothing our conscience with theology and philosophy. Yet we are bewildered that in so doing we have ravaged ourselves. Our exploitative rule over non-human nature was also a predation of humans. Almost asphyxiating in garbage, neurotic, like rats caged in the noise of an earth increasingly covered by concrete, still threatened by nuclear war between hostile societies, half starving in abundance, we die of diseases of our own making. Our survival programs are hastily designed and prove short-sighted. They restrict life even more as they continue to blackmail us by creating a non-existing scarcity of goods, to which the ecological is now added. Therefore, the constructed, unjust manipulation of economic distribution remains. Destruction shifts away from known phenomena toward new threats; at present, climate change looms most critically. The phenomenon of the human being is increasingly affected. Further standardization through the technology of metaphysics, transformation into an intelligent part of machinery, the technocratic prospect, is foreseeable. Our life, the clearing of Being, will be betrayed, extinguished; it will perish.

We cannot save ourselves. We searched anew and found nothing. We are already saved. We want for nothing. We are everything. This is something we vaguely understand. But as soon as we begin to think about it, our understanding of Being as something familiar at once eludes us and appears as self-deception caused by ignorance. So our vague understanding of Being must be guarded against a reason that demands transparency of phenomena. Our finitude justifies restraint; there remain enough phenomena that want to be revealed. To understand does not mean subjecting everything to the same procedure, but to find an approach that corresponds to the phenomenon. That could seem violent but must be accepted as long as it is appropriate to the phenomenon. It has been controversial which criteria should apply. Metaphysics had no interest in

ending the strife, otherwise it would have admitted its untruth. As long as every starting point is allowed and one may insist on one's opinion, metaphysics is safe from discovery. Its proper place is not questioned, for chaos reigns. But Heidegger's distinction between ontic order and ontological non-order, the ontological difference, is the most decisive defense against the technology of metaphysics. That is why there have been attempts to reinterpret and render ineffective Heidegger's leaving behind of metaphysics, its fading away in its course, as he presented in his critique of the notion of overcoming (Nietzsche). There is the conjecture that Heidegger really refers to God when speaking of the ontological phenomenon, or perhaps a perservering construct similar to the traditional ontology of substance. More artful is the assumption that Heidegger practices social criticism behind an ontological mask that should perhaps shield from criticism. In any case, the ontological difference was shallowed out, became one assumption among others. The ontological difference notes however that we have no theology of what is most effective and underscores that our reason must be receptive and that it is not the legislator. What we can understand is little enough, and we must be careful with it.

The ontological difference points to the difference that sustains our life and gives us back a sense of proportion. What we are familiar with is not the everyday hustle and bustle and it is not artifacts. If they disappeared, our life would not change. It might win. What enables a person to live and die happens and succeeds. The more we engage with and enter into the movement that sustains us, the more effortlessly and yet more intensely we live. It is not how many moments that counts; it is the *fulfilled* moment that is decisive. Fullness endures, it gives freely of itself; it is not a measure in length of time. It is rather a gift, of which we know only that it is immeasurable. The movement marked by ontological difference is so dependable that we do not even notice it. In order to be startled out of the constancy of the universe we have to ask why are there beings at all and not nothingness? When we become anxious and fail to see why the familiar should continue, we invent affirmations: myth, religion and metaphysics arise. These provide grounds to enumerate, calculate, give reasons and make provisions where a technology that would have let phenomena follow their own course would been sufficient. Our consciousness distrusts the familiar, and metaphysically we mistake it for the everyday. In doing so, we lose ourselves to the superficial. What remains undiscovered is that the most familiar in the everyday are precisely those techniques that make up our lives: we eat, speak, hate, run, stretch, hear, feel, understand, love, rest, feel pain, write, breathe, see, anticipate. These and other differentiated techniques are *how* we live. In each of them, as in all of them together, we correspond to the cosmos, but we are still far from potential fulfillment. Even hierarchical evaluation, which considers some practices to be more important than others, disguises their origin and diminishes their truth. From a cosmic perspective, everything is equally essential, and important enough to be fulfilled. In the clearing of our lives there are only fulfilled or disappointed phenomena, but none arranged according to priorities.

We find a rich life in the familiar, which inconspicuously awaits us. This is indeed a lure to retreat into private life, but fails the actuality of the familiar. It is not subjective and powerless, rather, power and society are waste products of its strength. Science, economics and ethics try to achieve with treachery what is already familiar to us. However, the alienation implied in this attempt obstructs life and creates for itself what it wanted to avoid. No one claims that humans are good or that nature is helpful, or that the cosmos governs our individual fate. An accord with cosmic movements is to be achieved for phenomena every time, can be tedious and fail. But failure summons those who deviate from their own nature. The individual must get involved with its changes instead of following rules and entrenching oneself in the casing of a world-view. Life's one-sidedness, which disturbs the rhythm of human nature, takes revenge, makes us sick, lets us perish. This is noticed even though we have learned to be tolerant and to regard even the most grievous deviations as worthy of existence. But as hard as society adamantly closes its eyes, or tries to acknowledge, even normalize failings such as corruption, cruelty, we do not accept it. Our intellect explains modes of existence, argues the potential for evil in everyone, given certain circumstances. The heart of it remains untouched. Theories on what being human is, always shoots wide of the mark. We may not know what it actually means to be a human being, but we do experience the process of self-fulfilling. An inhuman society, however, has an interest in weakening the sense of human activity that has been trained by the inconspicuous familiar. Our vague insight into the circumstances is then called prejudice since, obviously, bias shares a common source.

But we can trust the familiar. Reflecting on what, without intent, constitutes our life, brings us to the practice of technology. Not control, but generating is the functioning mode. Only as much as needed is used, there is no waste here, but rather living in moderation. Since failure can only show technology's degree of imperfection, it is success that is the guide. Whether something is destroyed or constructed says nothing yet about about the quality of the technology employed. Confused minds are kept occupied interpreting state actions. These are merely shells of events, once real, and of memories carried along, in tow: all materials for politicians' games. Decisions are made at the level of the inconspicuous familiar, our opening, and they are made as technological ones. In the event of technology, we humans see ourselves as technicians. We recognize that technology is intrinsic to us; the more advanced, the better. This training does not take place in

addition to our life, but is its reality. Heidegger restored to the inconspicuous familiar, forgotten in everyday life, its ontological, solemn rank and understood it as the openness of the human being. The technology of metaphysics is thus cut down to size, and only now can we measure how far metaphysics has deviated from the human individual. The concealed meaning of the basic principles of metaphysics (presence, absence, dichotomy, contradiction, hierarchy, causality, identity, difference, locality, temporality) can be expressed therein. This also solves the riddle of why metaphysical tyranny could often carry with it the appearance of law. The radical criticism of metaphysics, as undertaken by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, brings out those characteristics peculiar to human beings. They could not be so distorted by the technology of metaphysics so as to be lost forever. Heidegger showed the event of technology in outline, and we must now fill in the contours.

## Critique of the event of technology

At the same time, critique of the event of technology is imperative if we want to avoid technological optimism and the idols of technocracy. Modern technology does not show that it is the event. It does not seem new, nor revolutionary, it does not even seem amazing. It develops in the direction we expect, and no other phenomenon becomes visible. Through the imitation of natural processes, which formed the ideal and framework for technological intervention, humans completed nature, as then understood by the ancient Greeks. After the early modern era, technology was supposed to expand nature. But this notion, which directs us to exploit nature, has in effect been left behind by the most advanced technology which in design learns from nature. Today's technology has become more Greek. However, as it takes into consideration ever more correlations, operational malfunctions are less prevalent. But that was always its goal. Nor is automation a new project. From the beginning, technology favored the automatic, because it would then most resemble nature. Technology is becoming more and more consistent, developing in leaps and bounds. It is evolving into massive surveillance systems, yet remains the same, vital for us. Its nature is to adapt, strive to fit everywhere. It thus corresponds to our modern idea of truth, correctness by appropriateness, accordance and agreement. Its precise form, mathematics, guides cybernetic technology. With the planetary expansion of technology, which Heidegger thought through, it is becoming clear how the traditional interpretation of Being has established itself everywhere. Even the most advanced technology realizes its changed services under the conditions of metaphysics. The attempt to define technology as a non-metaphysical way of life and to contrast its true form against a traditional one, seems untenable.

   The reference to the traditionality of modern technology is undoubtedly correct, and there is a basic affinity between ancient *techne* and the technology of our time. An alternative interpretation of technology, as a "new technology," would be wishful thinking, and not able to cut the line of tradition. However, a changed thinking does not follow metaphysical categories; it does not interpret. The event of technology presents itself through the technology of truth, and the difference between history and Being means nothing to this kind of thinking, which took on an actual form. Technology occurred as the authenticity of the human. Nature did not need to be technically imitated, expanded or completed. Technology was and is human nature. Mathematics can never reach the measure technology effortlessly aligns itself to; it remains mathematics's festering wound. Changed thinking does not care whether its technology is metaphysical. The truth of metaphysics, as it is purposefully made increasingly narrowed, is inferior to the technological truth that remains open to reality. Although metaphysics demands that everything be measured by its norms and claims the concept of measure for itself, we cannot be impressed by this. Thinking has to correspond to what was granted by the world-view of metaphysical categories and to what is disfigured by them. The functioning of technology can never be decided by metaphysics. Only the insight into metaphysics's failure can provide us with information, and thus make the real comprehensible. Heidegger's radical critique of metaphysics, his step back to the origin of metaphysical thought, reveals the event of technology as a humane way of life.

   But does a defense of the event of technology that is critical of metaphysics not ontologize an instrumental technology? It is absurd to turn things into people, dependents into independents, and means into ends. By itself metaphysics does not do or refrain from anything; it is merely a traditional way of thinking capable of influencing our actions. Technology, for its part, is a dependent instrument, a form of action. A common definition of a technical act is that it is a form of action by which through a means a goal is accomplished in roundabout ways, which would have been difficult or impossible to reach directly. Accordingly, the idea that there could be a technical constraint to which we are subject would be senseless. Technology has no independent existence. Any constraint can be traced back to objectives and value decisions, even if this is not always apparent. Technology can show us what we can do, but never what we should do. The usual philosophy of technology, therefore, analyzes technology as a behavior, catalogues the various technical processes that occur, determines their relations with the natural sciences, and refers to the history of technology. Problems

of technological progress are also addressed; they are control problems. The present can be described as a technological age, since all spheres of life are affected by technology. But that is not to say that technology can become self-sufficient; people can block any technology. We need only to forgo them, consider them unsuitable means. It is our weak decision-making process today that creates the appearance of an independent technological development, but technology must retain its character as instrument. Otherwise, there would be a danger that behaviors that are not instrumental, such as the sensual, would also be made subject to technology. Restricting technology to its dependent status is our best protection against it.

Instruments described in such a technological philosophy are not ontologized in the event of technology, but left to be what they are. However, this satisfies the original sense of ontology as a determination of phenomena from the least to the singular. Technology is not an independent power, but neither is the individual independent of it. How could we free ourselves from our nature? We are technicians. But instrumental technology, despite its claim to supremacy, is only one instance of, and not the exemplary, human life technology. To instrumentalize this technology in its entirety would make tools of human beings, a situation fast approaching. Yet if we understand technology as event, then appropriate tasks are left for instrumental technology. However, the nature of technology, and thus of human beings, is not inferred from it. We must agree with the results from philosophy of technology, but not their insinuation, that with it everything has been said about technology, because we can experience the contrary. If technology is only a form of action and our nature must be sought in a theoretical or practical determination, the fundamental problem of theory and practice continues. We remain ineffective as theorists, violent as practitioners, and embody a post-Hegelian abstraction. Furthermore, it is fraudulent to claim this to be a dialectic of theory and practice, since there is no inclination to *elevate* theory and practice. From this would follow one would have to engage in a diversity in relation to which theory and practice are always one-sided. But as it is, two culprits exchange experiences, define their territories, and organize their raids. They are called planning and management of social progress. In the event of technology, we gain truth; it allows humans to live as they are able to live. The human individual exists technologically, as undemanding as cosmos happens. The individual technologies, which we call theory, practice and instrumental technology, are relieved of their claims and join together in their place, the technology of life.

But does such a determination of technology not correspond to its general understanding? The classical interpretation of technology took for granted that technology unites theory and practice. It was considered an application of theory and functioned as a reflection of given relations. But we need to ask at what level this accord takes place. It remains on the surface of the phenomena. One can doubt wheter technology – apart from its conceptual classification – is philosophically significant. Does it not rather belong to the engineering sciences, should it not be investigated sociologically, or might technology be a biological, and perhaps ethnological problem in extreme cases of the event. If the superficiality of the phenomenon of technology is not taken into account, any technical analysis falls prey to positivism. Visible reality is taken as the true; the existing is the real. A measure for improvement is missing. We would become someone different without being able to influence it. The positivistic sway of the surface would have prevailed in the event of technology.

But this view holds back technology, condemns it to instrumentality, persistently failing its nature. The planetary reach of technology is still described as a quantitative extension, and not acknowledged asqualitatively different. But nature is no more that which natural science measures, than technology is what we call, with an eye to its instructions for use, its functioning. Measuring lives off nature's self-fulfillment in the same way functioning lives off technology. The true technological effect is being inhibited, it would be devastating for the superficial phenomenon, its untrue side. If technology were left to the individual sciences, its illegitimate rule would be prolonged. The classical definition of technology came quite close to its true nature, but the unification of theory and practice was not recognized in its significance. When a phenomenon, which has led a Cinderella existence, is brought into the limelight, an event has taken place. The most despised behavior proves indispensable and determines the nature of the human individual, but such understanding depends upon the state of technological development. The ancient craftsman's technique could not make clear that it expresses a human life technology which exists before particularism, in unifying accord with success. Plato's universalization of the *techne* came closest to this phenomenon, but, as with the later attempts of Spinoza and Hegel, he lacked the evidence of a fulfilling technology. So it was assumed that what happens has been thought.

But is an automatic, technological system also autonomous? It is apparent that technology needs standards, purposes or decisions external to its system. In the event of technology human activity would devolve into a structure, anonymous, increasing the inhumanity of an already dehumanizing system. Cybernetic technology appears to have abandoned a means-ends approach to rationality. The computational method takes itself as its purpose, with the intent to reproduce. The self-preservation of the technological world becomes an end in itself. Is this the end of the dichotomy of means and ends? Modern technology now occupies both positions. It

is turning into a technocracy. But even then, technology is not the subject of technological decisions, people with a hidden agenda are. The constraints of the technological system serve human intentions.

We can have no doubt about it. But the event of technology is not a system that exists independently of humans; on the contrary, it reveals how objectified technological structures belong to our life technology. However, it does not exhaust itself in these structures. Purpose-driven rationality is not identical to, but an aberration of reasoning in the event of technology. The standards of cybernetic technology are not in themselves cybernetic, but the same as for all cosmic phenomena. The alternative is therefore not the technological or human subject of a decision, but the self-fulfilling or failing of a phenomenon. When a phenomenon is addressed by the subject-object schema, it is also possible to conceive of it as a subjective act. Templates of any kind can never reach the truth of a phenomenon, which is formed only at the moment of misconception or failure. Who decides about the truth of consequences? To whom do the consequences of a situation apply? Is the carnivorous human being worth more than an animal? Prudence is not enough; it requires a predetermined framework and is unable to grasp the whole. When we seek to achieve a goal, prudence can advise a course of action. But it cannot tell from the consequences whether the intention was good. The number of possible interpretations is too great, they depend too much on interests. We shut ourselves off from the truth of the consequences and begin to resemble a person who cannot sense pain. It is precisely for this reason that we are in mortal danger, because we cannot be warned and we notice too late the consequences of our actions. Our chief interest must therefore be to become aware, open to perceiving the feedback of our life in a physical organism as well as in the socio-organism in real time.

Does the current world situation force the reduction of a multiplicity of phenomena into singularity? The human individual is a technician, but should s/he not be more? Today's event of technology colors all phenomena. But must it be the night in which all cows turn black? Hegel called such reductionism unphilosophical. Heidegger's explanation of technology's planetary reign acknowledged contemplative thinking. Taking this further, should such thinking also become a technology? Thus would a form of violence, the *releasement*, be inherent in the non-violenct event of technology, surpassing even that of metaphysics. In Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, beings were multiple, ambiguous and remained in need of definition. With the event of technology the expectation of an end-of-times, a golden age, and a promise of the birth of true humanity is awakened. But is this not another attempt to assert the one-sidedness of the world? The event of technology would be turned into a question of faith. Others will rightfully see more of an economic, political or scientific event at work in the modern age.

In the best of cases, the event of technology is a utopia, that means an objection, because such an ideal state of technology does not yet exist. So there is no place from which we speak about it. All sorts of things can be read into it, and none of it verifiable. How we could get from our present to such a utopian event of technology is not said. Is it even permitted to ask this question? Is it not true that in many areas of the world we continue to live at war with nature? It this light, the dream of an already concluded peace with nature seems irresponsible. The illusion of an event of technology hinders the solution of real problems.

Such objections are obvious only to the stubbornly held bias that technology is instrumental. Then the event of technology would be an unbearably one-sided, anthropological reduction. But instrumental technology, however much it sways our current understanding of technology, is a sector of technology with a limited range of use. The interpretation of human nature as technology understands it cosmologically. Technology does not close down diversity, but opens it up. Our life technology recognizes whatever shows itself, and therefore no definition of Being, however ambiguous and willing to learn, can compare to the vastness of the event of technology. Here, no thing is ever categorically delimited, because technology is safeguarded through just interaction, not by violently breaking things down into individual components. Whether the phenomenon is successful, shows itself. In technology, the human individual corresponds to this interplay of revealing and concealing of self; our knowledge is participation. Every phenomenon to which we belong needs human technology for its happening. Technology helps it become what it can become of itself for us.

However, with metaphysical technology, which is dictated by fear of extinction and for which phenomena are material, we destroy phenomena and their context. The humanistic plea for non-technological sides of humans speaks blindly in favor of preserving the already existing technology. Science, economy, politics, but also ecology or religion cannot constitute an event, for they bring misfortune upon the individual, do not offer a path into her/his nature. Undeniably, the tasks, so poorly handled by today's technology, raise pressing questions. But merely to be able to ask we need a philosophical technology of truth, and this technology is not achievable through a reform of consciousness. Radical rethinking alone would be preparing for it. On the other hand, those who point to the material conditions in which the world is changing, miss the problem. How does anyone perceive changes when a millennia-old way of thinking and feeling, trained to survive in the war with nature, controls perception? Philosophical reflection does not directly change the world, but false thinking excludes us from comprehending it, to which humankind today bears witness. The event of

technology happens, but, under the spell of metaphysics, confronted with life, we fail.

fiction,
scholarship,
poetry

utopos publishing